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Abstract: Litigation is costly because information is not free.  Given that information is 
costly and perfect information prohibitively costly, courts will occasionally err.  Finally, 
the fact that information is costly implies an unavoidable degree of informational 
asymmetry between disputants.  This paper presents a model of the civil justice system 
that incorporates these features of the real world and probes its implications for 
compliance with the law, efficiency of law, accuracy in adjudication, trial outcome 
statistics, and the evolution of legal standards.  The model’s claims are applied to and 
tested against the relevant empirical and legal literature. 
 
JEL Classifications: D74, K10, K13, K41 
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Because the gathering and provision of information is costly, disputants must incur legal 
expenses to present information to courts.  Litigation is costly because information is not 
free.  Moreover, given that information is costly and perfect information prohibitively 
costly, courts will occasionally err in determining innocence or guilt.  Finally, the fact 
that information is costly implies an unavoidable degree of informational asymmetry 
between disputants. 
 
This paper presents a model of the civil justice system that incorporates these features of 
the real world and probes its implications for compliance with the law, trial outcome 
statistics (e.g., plaintiff trial win rates), efficiency of law, accuracy in adjudication, and 
the evolution of legal standards.  These implications address some long-standing issues in 
the law and economics literature.   
 
One such issue is the difference between efficiency as understood in the law-and-
economics literature analyzing legal doctrine and efficiency as understood more 
generally.  Doctrinally efficient rules would be efficient if followed in the course of 
ordinary social interaction by potential plaintiffs and defendants.  Much of the economic 
analysis of law literature explains why common law rules appear to be doctrinally 
efficient (Posner, 2011).  However, doctrinally efficient rules are not necessarily 
operationally efficient.1  Operationally efficient legal rules seek to generate efficient 
compliance levels given the costs of operating the legal system, which are primarily due 
to imperfect information.  In some circumstances, information costs prevent courts from 
implementing doctrinally efficient standards, and compel them to alter standards in light 
of such costs.  These altered standards lead to predictable distortions away from 
efficiency, though they may be preferable to feasible alternatives. 
 
                                                 
1 The operational efficiency test was introduced in the law and economics literature by Guido Calabresi 
(1970). 
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Another long-standing issue addressed here is the social value of judicial accuracy.  In 
this framework, some degree of error may be socially desirable, and more error may be 
preferable to less.  In the absence of error, a regime of perfect legal compliance would be 
unlikely, because no complainant would incur costs to sue when the compliance rate is 
perfect.2  However, the risk of error makes the threat to sue credible even when the 
compliance rate is perfect.3 
 
Another issue is the effect of informational asymmetry in litigation on trial outcome 
statistics.  This matter was addressed in Hylton (1993), which proposed the asymmetric 
information hypothesis as an explanation of the patterns reflected in the data on trial win 
rates for plaintiffs.  The most common theory of trial outcome statistics is due to Priest 
and Klein (1984), who hypothesized that win rates will tend toward 50 percent in the 
absence of a substantial disparity in stakes – because only the most uncertain cases 
proceed to judgment.  However, in a setting of asymmetric information, trial win rates are 
unlikely to meet the 50 percent conjecture of Priest and Klein.  On the other hand, trial 
win rates, I show here, are not as unpredictable, as suggested by Shavell (1996).  Trial 
win rates are associated with legal compliance rates in a predictable manner.4  I show that 
several puzzles and anomalies in the statistics on trial outcomes – such as the low 
plaintiff win rates in medical malpractice litigation – can be explained by the model 
presented here.5 
 
Lastly, I address the question of legal evolution.  How does information get embedded in 
legal rules?  I show that this model provides an explanation for how legal rules evolve 
over time.  Informationally advantaged litigants tend to prevail, especially on appeal, and 
this tends to drive the menu of issues in appellate courts and the rules generated by those 
courts.  Legal standards are enhanced, toward efficiency, as courts incorporate the private 
                                                 
2 Ordover (1978).  Extending this concept to settlement negotiations, see Spier (1997). 
3 Hylton (1990). 
4 Hylton (2002), Klerman and Lee (2014), Wickelgren (2013). 
5 Many of the empirical puzzles I address here were uncovered in articles by the late Professor Theodore 
Eisenberg and coauthors (Eisenberg, 1990; Clermont and Eisenberg, 1992, 1998, 2001; Eisenberg and 
Heise, 2009). 
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information of litigants.6  On the other hand, it is possible to have evolution away from 
efficiency – and against “the rule of law” – if the informational advantage consists of 
superior access to information on judicial biases or errors.  Evolution of this sort, toward 
class-biased rules, is consistent with Bentham’s account of the common law (Postema, 
1986). 
 
The model here builds mostly on three papers - Hylton (1990, 1993, and 2006).  Most 
important for my purposes, this model provides a unified, tidier, and simpler framework 
while extending and updating claims from these earlier papers.  My goal is to address 
seemingly disparate questions in the law and economics literature within a single cradle-
to-grave model of the civil justice system.  The emphasis here in not on theory but on the 
derivation of empirically testable propositions.  I have incorporated discussions of the 
relevant empirical and legal literature as tests or as applications of the model’s claims. 
 
Part II presents the basic model and its results.  Although this is a model of civil liability, 
I will use the terms “guilt” and “liability” interchangeably for ease of expression.  Part 
II.F concludes Part II by presenting implications of the model for compliance with the 
law and for the social value of error.  Part III addresses conflicting concepts of efficiency 
of law (doctrinal versus operational). Part IV examines the litigation and settlement 
process, and uses the model to explain some of the data on trial outcomes.  Part V 




The model consists of injurers and victims, all risk neutral.  I will use the terms injurer, 
actor, and defendant interchangeably.  Similarly, I will treat the terms victim and plaintiff 
as the same.  Although I use the term injurer, this is not a model limited to accidental and 
intentional physical injuries.  The injurer could be a violator of the antitrust laws, or a 
party who breaches a contract or fails to meet a regulatory standard of conduct. 
                                                 
6 Cooter, Kornhauser, and Lane (1979), Hylton (2006).  For critiques of the efficiency thesis, see Hadfield 
(1992), Klerman (2017). 





Taking Care: The injurer has a choice to take care or not to take care.  To “take care” 
means taking an action that reduces the foreseeable harm to the victim.  This notion 
applies to many areas of law.  In the negligence setting, taking care means taking an 
action that reduces the likelihood of harm to the victim or refraining from an action that 
increases the likelihood of harm.  In the intentional torts or crime setting, taking care 
means forgoing the profit from an intentional harmful act.  For example, in the antitrust 
setting a firm can take care by refraining from monopolizing its market.  In the contracts 
setting, an actor might take care by refraining from breaching the contract or by taking 
the effort to clarifying the contract’s terms. 
 
If the injurer takes care, he suffers a burden of compliance x > 0, a random variable 
distributed according to G, with corresponding density g.  The injurer knows his 
compliance burden, though it is unobservable to victims. 
 
If the injurer chooses not to take care, the victim will suffer a loss with probability p.  If 
the injurer chooses to take care, the victim will suffer a loss with probability q, where p > 
q > 0.  
 
Compliance: Given the foregoing, I will say that the injurer complied with the law if he 
took care when taking care was required by the legal standard, and that he failed to 
comply if he did not take care even though taking care was required by the standard.  It 
follows that perfect compliance exists when those injurers and only those injurers who 
are required by the law to take care do so.  Undercompliance exists when there are 
injurers who fail to take care even though the law requires them to do so, and 
overcompliance exists when there are injurers who take care even though the law does 
not require them to do so. 
 
B. Victims 
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In the event of an injury, the victim’s loss is v, observed by all parties.  Further, v has the 
distribution function H with corresponding density h, where  
 
0
( ) ( )E v vh v dv
∞




Courts decide cases on the basis of information (evidence) brought before them by the 
parties in litigation pertaining to the injury suffered by the victim.  Since it is costly to 
bring evidence to a court, litigation is costly for both parties.  The plaintiff’s (victim’s) 
cost of litigating is cp > 0; the defendant’s (injurer’s, actor’s) cost of litigating is cd > 0. 
 
Since perfect information requires infinite resources, courts occasionally make mistakes 
in determining liability.  A court may erroneously fail to hold a guilty defendant (that is, a 
defendant who has failed to comply with the law) liable with probability θ1, which I will 
refer to as the probability of type-1 error,7 or the probability of a false acquittal.  
Similarly, the court may erroneously hold an innocent defendant (that is, a defendant who 
has complied with the law) liable with probability θ2, which I will refer to as the 
probability of type-2 error or the probability of a false conviction.  Victims and injurers 
know θ1 and θ2, and the courts are reasonably accurate, such that 1- θ1 - θ2 > 0.8 
 
D. The Legal Standard 
 
                                                 
7 Type-1 error is erroneously rejecting the null hypothesis.  If we treat the null hypothesis as guilt, then 
type-1 error here means erroneously finding innocence.  Arguably, this is an undesirable premise because 
of the presumption of innocence in criminal law.  But since this is a model of civil liability, the importance 
attached to the initial presumption is less clear.  For convenience, I follow much of the literature in the 
implicit assumption of guilt as the null hypothesis, see Polinsky and Shavell (1990).  On estimates of error 
rates (based on a sample of criminal case verdicts), see Spencer (2007) (finding false conviction rate of .25, 
and false acquittal rate of .14). 
8 In words, this implies that the probability of an accurate finding of liability (nonliability) is greater than 
the probability of an inaccurate finding of liability (nonliability).  A court that decided cases by a coin toss 
would violate the requirement. 
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If a dispute comes to court, the court will attempt to determine, subject to error, whether 
the injurer violated the legal standard.  In the absence of error, a court would find that the 
defendant violated the legal standard if (1) the defendant’s care or forbearance was 
required by the legal standard under the circumstances and (2) the defendant did not take 
care or forebear as required by the standard.  Virtually every legal standard fits this 
description.9  For example, in the torts setting, a defendant should be found negligent if x 
< (p-q)E(v) and he failed to take care.  A similar legal standard effectively holds in 
contract law.10  Similarly, in antitrust, courts use the rule of reason test, which compares 
efficiencies with anticompetitive effects.11  The test in antitrust is equivalent to a 
comparison of the profits of the defendant to the loss borne by consumers.12  Even in 
intellectual property law a legal standard similar to the general one described appears to 
apply.13   
 
Summing up, the legal standard is an inquiry into compliance (did the injurer take care 
when care was required?) coupled with an inquiry into whether the burden of taking care 
is less than some measure of the incremental social loss, where social loss is a function of 
the expected victim loss: 
 
x < (p-q)Ψ(E(v)) 
 
                                                 
9 Craswell (1999), at 2217-2219. 
10 On “fault” in contract law, see Posner (2009), Hillman (2014).  The general similarity between the 
objective standards of tort law and the standards of contract law was explained in Lectures VIII and IX of 
Holmes (1881).  Consider something as simple as determining whether a defendant breached a contract 
whose terms were not clear.  Under the objective reasonableness approach, a court would determine 
whether the burden of complying with the strict interpretation is reasonable in light of the potential harm to 
the promisee.  This is equivalent to a negligence inquiry. 
11 See United States v. Microsoft Corporation, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
12 In a simple model of monopolization, with constant average and marginal cost, the gain to the 
monopolist (from monopolizing) is the sum of the profit and the efficiency gain.  The loss to consumers is 
the sum of the consumer wealth transfer and the deadweight loss.  If the profit is equal to the transfer, then 
the comparison of the efficiency gain to the deadweight loss is equivalent to comparing the profit to the 
total consumer loss. 
13 The question whether compliance (non-infringement) was required depends on an analysis of the patent’s 
validity.  This analysis is at bottom a balancing test comparing static and dynamic costs of protecting the 
particular innovation from competing with a close substitute.  Merges and Nelson (1990), Cass and Hylton 
(2013).  The static cost of intellectual property is the social burden of forgoing infringement.  The social 
loss from infringement (reduction in incentives) typically correlates with the loss suffered by the patentee. 
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If this condition holds for a particular actor, then that injurer is legally culpable for failing 
to comply.  If, on the other hand, for a particular actor x > (p – q)Ψ(E(v)), then the actor 
is not legally culpable.  Such an actor is legally immune from liability.  Of course, given 
the possibility of judicial error, legal immunity does not imply actual immunity from 
liability. 
 
Again, torts and antitrust provide illustrations.  In torts, x is the burden of taking care and 
Ψ(E(v)) = E(v).  In antitrust, x is the forgone profit from refraining from a monopolizing 
act, and Ψ(E(v)) is the expected total harm suffered by consumers (monopoly transfer 
plus deadweight loss).14 
 
E. The Legal Process and the Incentive to Comply with the Law 
 
If the court decides in favor of the plaintiff, it will award the plaintiff the value of his loss 
v.15  A victim will file a lawsuit when wv > cp, where w is the probability that the court 
will find that the injurer violated the legal standard, given that an injury has occurred.  
The probability that a suit will be filed after an injury is therefore 1- H(cp/w).   
 
Consider the incentive to comply for a legally culpable injurer.  In the case where the 
injurer has complied with the legal standard, and the resulting probability of harm is q, 
the probability of liability, conditional on harm, is only θ2.  Similarly, in the case where 
the injurer has not complied, and the resulting probability of harm is p, the probability of 
liability, conditional on harm, is 1- θ1.  Thus, given the threat of liability, a legally 
culpable injurer will comply (take care) when 
 








< − − − > + − 
 
     
                                                 
14 To illustrate, if pc and qc represent competitive price and output respectively, pm and qm the monopoly 
outcomes, then in the case of linear demand and constant marginal cost the total harm to consumers is (pm – 
pc)(3/2)qm = (3/2)(victim harm). 
15 To simplify, I assume the award is not enhanced by a multiplier, though it would be straightforward to 
modify the model to include a multiplier.  For a special case of this model that incorporates a multiplier, see 
Hylton and Miceli (2005). 



















The right hand side of the above inequality is the increase in liability that results from 
failing to comply with the law.16   
 
Now consider the incentive to take care for an actor who is not legally culpable.  Such an 
actor will be held liable only if type-2 error occurs with probability θ2.  The risk of such 
error occurring could lead an actor who is not legally culpable to take care if:17 
 












Given the possibility of judicial error, the probability of finding a legal violation 
conditional on an injury, w, is a function of the error probabilities.  Specifically, if r is the 
probability that the injurer violated the legal standard given an injury, then  
 
w = r(1 - θ1) + (1 - r)θ2.   
 
where 
                                                 
16 Although this model does not explicitly incorporate settlement of disputes (I consider settlement 
explicitly later), it can easily be interpreted to include settlements.  To do so, simply interpret the litigation 
costs as averaging over the settled and non-settled cases, and the expected harm as averaging over both 
types of dispute as well. The error rates would also average over the settled and non-settled cases.  For 
example, the “false-acquittal probability”, under this approach, would incorporate the case of a settlement 
payment or of a court judgment when the defendant is innocent.  This is the approach to calculating the 
error rate in compensation reported in Studdert et al. (2006). 
17 This condition is arguably too simple because it assumes that the probability of false conviction, for the 
legally immune actor, is the same whether he complies or does not comply.  It is plausible that the 
probability of false conviction is lower if the actor complies.  If the probability is zero when the immune 
actor complies, then the risk of overcompliance increases greatly.  Grady (1983) shows that causation 
doctrine in negligence law dampens the overcompliance effect in this scenario. 




( ) ( ( ))
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and where gn is the probability that an actor does not take care and is given by 
 












I will refer to r as the noncompliance rate.  Undercompliance exists when there are actors 
for whom x < (p-q)Ψ(E(v)) and the expectation of liability is insufficient to lead them to 
comply with the legal standard.  Overcompliance exists when the expectation of liability 
causes some actors for whom x > (p-q)Ψ(E(v)) to take care.  Perfect compliance is 
observed when only those actors for whom x < (p-q)Ψ(E(v)) are led by the expectation of 




Here are the key implications of this model. 
 
1. Deterrence: As long as courts are reasonably accurate (i.e., the sum of false acquittal 
and false conviction probabilities is less than one), the expectation of liability will have a 
deterrent effect on legally culpable actors (sufficiency).  Reasonable accuracy is both 
necessary and sufficient to ensure that the increase in liability that results from failing to 
take care is greater for a legally culpable actor than for one who is legally immune.  It 
follows that reasonable accuracy is necessary and sufficient to rule out an equilibrium of 
simultaneous undercompliance and overcompliance. 
 
For the first claim, note that liability has a deterrent effect as long as the marginal 
increase in expected liability from failing to comply is positive.  The reasonable accuracy 
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requirement is sufficient for this to hold.  For the second claim, note that for any given 
actor, either x < (p-q)Ψ(E(v))  or x > (p-q)Ψ(E(v)). Suppose there exist actors who are 
legally culpable but do not find it privately optimal to comply (undercompliance).  For 
such actors  
 












For overcompliance to also exist, then there must be actors for whom 
 












For this to be true, p(1 - θ1) – qθ2 < (p – q)θ2 must hold, which requires 1- θ1 - θ2 < 0, 
contradicting the reasonably accuracy requirement.18 
 
This first implication identifies the fundamental reason liability serves as a deterrent even 
when courts make mistakes in determining compliance.  Legally culpable actors pay a 
price if they fail to comply and that price is higher for them than for the legally immune 
as long as courts are reasonably accurate.  In a study of medical malpractice liability and 
deterrence, White (1994) (at 82, exhibit 3), relying on an empirical analysis in Farber and 
White (1991), estimates that the marginal increase in liability to a physician for failing to 
take care is on average roughly equal to $5,000.  White also finds that false acquittal and 
false conviction error rates for medical malpractice are roughly 15 percent.19  A recent 
                                                 
18 The remaining claims are easily proven, see Hylton (1990). 
19 A related study reports considerably higher error rates close to 25 percent, see Studdert et al. (2006).  
However, the estimates in Studdert et al. use data both on settlement payments and court judgments.  As 
noted earlier, this model could be modified to include both settlements and court judgments, and applied to 
Studdert et al. study’s estimates.  This would require distinguishing the average payments in the two events 
(where settlement payouts are on average less than court judgments).  In a suitably modified version of this 
model, the implied error rates would be less than the levels reported in Studdert et al.   
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empirical study of medical malpractice litigation confirms the deterrence findings of 
Farber and White.20 
 
The deterrence result here should be compared with Craswell and Calfree (1986), who 
show that undercompliance and overcompliance may exist simultaneously.  Their result 
could also hold in this model if it were modified to permit the reasonable accuracy 
condition to fail over some specific range of x.  Specifically, if the false conviction rate 
increases near the threshold of legal culpability, then the reasonable accuracy condition 
could fail to hold near the threshold, generating both incentives to undercomply and to 
overcomply.21 
 
2. Expectation of Liability: Equilibrium requires that the probability of finding 
noncompliance (guilt) be positive in a civil justice system. Thus, there must always exist 
some actors who expect to be found guilty of failing to comply with the legal standard.  
More specifically, there must always exist (1) some legally culpable actors who fail to 
comply with the law or (2) actors who are legally immune and who nonetheless expect to 
be erroneously found guilty.  
 
The essential reason for this was first articulated in Ordover (1978), though the 
proposition here is broader and the model broader in scope.  The basic intuition is that if 
there are no actors at risk of being found liable – that is, if everyone is completely free of 
any chance of being found in violation of the law – then no victims would have an 
incentive to bring a legal action in response to an injury.  But then no actor would have 
an incentive to comply with the law.  Thus an outcome in which the probability of 
finding noncompliance is zero cannot be an equilibrium.  Because of information costs, a 
Nirvana where everyone complies with the law and no one sues cannot exist. 
 
                                                 
20 See Iizuka (2013). 
21 To return to Grady (1983) (see note 17), if the risk of false conviction for the legally immune depends on 
whether the actor complies, then this sort of distortion is quite plausible.  Under this assumption, the 
marginal increase in liability from false conviction is especially high for the legally immune, generating the 
discontinuity that Grady describes in his article. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3223581 
 12 
This point applies generally to civil litigation – torts, contracts, antitrust, etc.  As long as 
the cost of providing information to courts is positive, and consequently it is prohibitively 
expensive to provide complete information to a court, there must be some degree of 
noncompliance or risk of erroneous conviction for failing to comply. 
 
3. Compliance: Three types of compliance equilibrium are possible in a civil justice 
system: (i) one in which the probability of a guilty (liability) verdict exceeds the 
probability of false conviction and there is undercompliance; (ii) a second in which the 
probability of a guilty verdict is equal to the probability of false conviction and there is 
perfect compliance; and (iii) a third in which the probability of a guilty verdict is equal to 
the probability of false conviction and there is overcompliance. 
 
Thus, although the probability of a guilty verdict must be positive in equilibrium, this 
does not mean that a perfect (or over) compliance equilibrium cannot exist.  If everyone 
who is legally culpable complies, plaintiffs will still have an incentive to sue if false 
convictions are possible. 
 
It may seem to be a paradox that a perfect or an overcompliance equilibrium could exist, 
given public knowledge of variables such as the judicial error probabilities and the 
equilibrium compliance rate.  For example, one might think that if courts know that the 
equilibrium is one of perfect compliance, they would exonerate any defendant of guilt 
(liability) on the basis of general information that the equilibrium is one of perfect 
compliance.  However, courts do not determine guilt or innocence based on knowledge of 
statistical generalities.  Courts determine guilt based on information brought before them 
by the parties involved in the transaction that injured the plaintiff.  Thus, even if the 
equilibrium is one of perfect or overcompliance, courts will still examine the evidence 
brought before them and may erroneously conclude that the defendant violated the law. 
 
4. Social Value of Error: A perfect (or over-) compliance equilibrium requires a positive 
probability of false conviction. 
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It follows that judicial error is not necessarily detrimental to deterrence.  Indeed, error in 
the form of a positive false conviction risk appears to be necessary to have a perfect 
compliance equilibrium. 
 
This result requires some reconciliation with standard “accuracy in adjudication” 
arguments.22  Returning to the first point above, deterrence generally improves with 
accuracy.  If, for example, accuracy could be enhanced by investing in some technology, 
then an increase in such investment would cause the marginal increase in liability due to 
noncompliance to increase.23  Thus, in the standard analysis of accuracy, improving 
accuracy enhances deterrence, and social welfare, as long as the marginal gain from 
enhanced deterrence exceeds the cost of improving accuracy.  However, the analysis here 
shows that the relationship between accuracy and deterrence is more complicated when 
one explicitly incorporates the costs of providing information to courts.  A biased 
approach to enhancing accuracy that aims at reducing false acquittals more than reducing 
false convictions may enhance welfare more than either a neutral approach to enhancing 
accuracy or an approach that focuses on reducing false convictions.24 
   
III. Legal Standards and Efficiency 
 
In much of the literature, the legal standard x < (p-q)Ψ(E(v)) is argued to be efficient 
(e.g., Posner, 2011).  For example, in the torts context, the Hand Formula, x < (p-q)E(v), 
encourages the potential tortfeasor to take care when and only when care is efficient.  
However, when litigation costs and judicial error probabilities are taken into 
consideration, compliance with the legal standard may no longer be efficient. 
 
The inconsistencies between these two approaches illustrate the conflict between 
doctrinal efficiency and operational efficiency.  Analysis of common law efficiency tends 
                                                 
22 Kaplow (1994), Posner (2001, at 336-379). 
23 The change in p(1- θ1) – qθ2 is – (pdθ1/dz + qdθ2/dz), which is positive under the assumed effect of the 
technology. 
24 This contradicts the theory commonly accepted in criminal procedure that reducing false convictions is 
socially preferable to reducing false acquittals (In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 1970).  Of course, criminal 
procedure is different from the civil justice system considered here.  The basis for the bias endorsed in 
Winship is a concern for the social costs of imprisonment and the incentives of public enforcement agents. 
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to focus solely on the question of doctrinal efficiency.  Operational efficiency would 
consider whether a given legal standard is efficient in light of the actual operation of the 
law. 
 
The case for operational efficiency as the objective, rather than doctrinal efficiency, 
would appear to be obvious.  Society should concern itself with efficiency in operation, 
not efficiency in theory.  However, even recognizing this, an argument for examining 
doctrinal efficiency still can be advanced.  If legal doctrine serves mostly as a set of 
instructions to guide conduct, and if it is in this role that it has its most important effect 
on behavior, then society should concern itself with doctrinal efficiency as much or 
perhaps more than operational efficiency.  For example, if once a legal norm is 
established it operates independently of the threat of liability, then the efficiency of that 
norm in isolation should be of central if not primary interest (Shavell, 2002). 
 
It should be clear that this analysis points to a link between operational efficiency, 
norms,25 and doctrinal efficiency.  Doctrinal efficiency deserves to be a central social 
welfare concern only if society adopts rules established by courts, or rules that would be 
discovered or established by courts,26 as guidelines governing social interaction.  If 
society adopts such rules as norms, then the doctrinally efficiency of such rules becomes 
an important consideration because the rules either reflect norms that already operate, or 
establish norms that will operate broadly, and once established the courts effectively 
disappear.  Such norms could be propagated within society through legal advice,27 or 
though informal sanctions.28  However, if such norms do not exist, then the case for 
                                                 
25 Cooter (1994), McAdams (1997), Posner (2000). 
26 Blackstone (1979, 63-92). 
27 If the advice consists solely of information on expected liability, taking litigation costs and judicial error 
rates into account, then the level of compliance generated through norm propagation, mediated by legal 
advice, is no different from the level of compliance that would be generated through direct information on 
the expected liability.  However, since litigation would be avoided through such propagation, the 
operational efficiency standard would be inappropriate, and compliance levels distorted away from 
efficiency.  If the advice ignores litigation costs (and judicial error rates) and instead focuses on the costs of 
compliance and benefits in terms of injury avoidance, then it would result in efficient compliance.  For a 
model that allows for (doctrinally) efficient compliance resulting from legal advice, see Shavell (1988). 
28 Ostracism by cooperators in a community could internalize doctrinally efficient norms, Cooter (1994). 
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analyzing or justifying legal rules on the basis of doctrinal efficiency would appear to be 
weak. 
 
Another implication of this model is that in light of information constraints binding on 
courts, there are some legal standards that are unlikely to meet even the doctrinal 
efficiency standard.  This is observed especially in areas where factors other than the 
defendant’s compliance failure might account for the plaintiff’s injury – the so-called 
factual causation cases.  Courts often hold that the defendant is immune from liability 
because the injury suffered by the plaintiff would have happened even if the defendant 
had complied with the law.  Such a finding often relies on information revealed only after 
the injury has occurred.  By using such ex post information to determine whether the 
defendant should be held liable, courts may distort the ex ante effect of the legal standard 
(Hylton and Lin, 2013).  However, in such settings, the information necessary to frame an 
efficient test is often lacking.   
 
IV. The Litigation Process 
 
How does litigation arise in this framework?  I have assumed plaintiffs do not know 
whether the defendant is innocent or guilty of violating the legal standard.  The plaintiff 
sues knowing the general likelihood of a finding of guilt (w), based on judicial error 
probabilities and the rate of compliance.  The defendant has the same information, and in 
addition knows his specific innocence or guilt.  If defendants did not act strategically in 
settlement, innocent defendants would reject settlement offers and guilty defendants 
would accept them, revealing their status.  No suits would proceed to trial. 
 
A. Incorporating Settlement 
 
The problem of explaining litigation under informational asymmetry has been addressed 
in models by Png (1983, 1987), Reinganum and Wilde (1986), and Bebchuk (1984).  
Png’s (and Reinganum-Wilde) is a signaling model and Bebchuk’s is a screening model.  
While signaling would appear to be the natural choice for modeling litigation, the 
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screening model is easier to analyze.  The Bebchuk model assumes plaintiffs know the 
distribution of the defendant’s guilt probability while defendants know the true 
probability.   
 
In this paper’s model, plaintiffs know more than the distribution of the guilt probability.  
They know the probability of guilt based on the noncompliance rate r (conditional on 
information specific to the type of injurious event) and public information on the 
likelihood of judicial error.  Defendants, on the other hand, know with certainty whether 
they are guilty or innocent. 
 
Since the screening model is easier to analyze, I will present a version of the screening 
model that is consistent with the information structure assumed in the previous parts of 
this paper.  The model I offer is one of systemic and idiosyncratic informational 
asymmetry.   
 
Because of systemic informational asymmetry, only the defendant knows whether he is 
guilty or innocent.  However, in addition to this systemic difference, there is an 
idiosyncratic type of informational asymmetry.  The idiosyncratic asymmetry arises from 
information that the defendant has peculiar to his case that leads him to predict, 
rationally, that his likelihood of conviction is either higher or lower than the average for 
innocent or for guilty defendants.  The idiosyncratic factor could arise from facts peculiar 
to the defendant’s case, or something as simple as knowledge that the judge is likely to 
hold a personal grudge against the defendant. 29  Such idiosyncratic asymmetry seems to 
be realistic as an assumption, and enables the model to both remain simple and explain 
some puzzling features of trial outcome statistics. 
  
The defendant’s predictions of the probability of liability are as follows  
 
                                                 
29 The idiosyncratic shocks could be transformed, with only minor alterations in the treatment of the model, 
to purely psychological impressions that have nothing to do with accurate information on the real outcome 
from a trial.  Relatively optimistic defendants would tend to litigate and relatively pessimistic defendants 
would tend to settle (Shavell, 1982).  On the psychological basis for optimism in litigation, see Rachlinski 
(1996). 
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2 dθ ε+   if innocent 
 
11 dθ η− +  if guilty 
 
where εd has density fε and distribution function Fε, ηd has density fη and distribution Fη, 
and E(εd) = E(ηd) = 0.  For the innocent defendant εd is centered around θ2 on the interval 
[θ2-a, θ2+b] and for the guilty defendant ηd is centered around 1-θ1 on the interval [1-θ1-
b, 1-θ1+a].  The idiosyncratic shock distributions are assumed to be mirror image 
reflections.30  The systemic information asymmetry is captured by the first terms in the 
probability estimates above. 
 
Although only the defendant knows whether he is guilty or innocent, both the plaintiff 
and the defendant know w, r, and 1-θ1 and θ2.  Plaintiffs and defendants both know the 
distributions of the idiosyncratic terms εd and ηd, but only defendants observe their 
respective idiosyncratic terms. 
 
Assume that the plaintiff always has an incentive to sue because - Cp + (θ2-a)J > 0, where 
J is the damages award.31  The plaintiff makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer S to the 
defendant.  The defendant, if innocent, will accept the plaintiff’s offer if S < (θ2 + εd)J + 







ε θ−≥ −  
 
Thus, the greater the innocent defendant’s idiosyncratic upward adjustment on the risk of 
conviction, the more likely is settlement.  For an innocent defendant, the probability of 
settlement is therefore 
                                                 
30 If the densities are graphed over x, fε(x) = fη(-x). This assumption allows for nonsymmetrical densities.  
The case where the two densities are entirely symmetrical is just a special case of this assumption. 
31 Assuming the court accurately determines damages, J is a specific realization of v (from the previous 
part).  I prefer to use J here because the loss is fixed and observable at the time of settlement negotiations, 
whereas the model in the previous part treats v as a random variable.  (Alternatively, I could use the 
notation v0 rather than J to denote a realization of v.) 
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2( | ) 1 d
S CP settle innocent F
Jε




By the same reasoning, the probability of settlement with a guilty defendant is 
 
1( | ) 1 (1 )d
S CP settle guilty F
Jη
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The first bracketed term is the expected payoff to the plaintiff if the defendant is innocent 
and the second is the expected payoff if the defendant is guilty.  Consider the case of 
innocence first.  If the defendant accepts the settlement, the plaintiff receives S.  If the 
defendant rejects the settlement offer, the plaintiff receives his expected payoff from 
litigation, which incorporates the plaintiff’s knowledge that idiosyncratic private 
information (such as the defendant’s knowledge that the judge dislikes him) influences 
the defendant’s decision to reject or accept.  This pattern repeats for the guilty defendant 
in the second bracketed term. 
 
Differentiating the plaintiff’s payoff function with respect to S yields the first-order 
condition: 
 






(1 )[1 ( )] ( )[1 ( (1 ))]
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d d
p dd d
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− − − + − − −
  +     − −
= − − + − −      
     
 
 
The plaintiff trades off an extra dollar of income from a higher settlement (left hand side) 
against the loss he incurs if litigation results (right hand side).  Obviously if the 
conditional probability of compliance is either 1 or 0, this simplifies greatly, with the 
plaintiff choosing an optimal settlement amount on the assumption that the population of 
defendants consists of either innocent actors entirely or guilty actors entirely.  If the 
conditional probability of noncompliance is not in either corner, then it is still possible 
that the settlement amount will be geared to elicit an optimal payoff with respect to an 
innocent defendant only (or with respect to a guilty defendant only).  The reason is that 
the uncertainty range surrounding the idiosyncratic shocks may not overlap. 
 
This model is similar to an example discussed in Shavell (1996).  Shavell examines a 
special case in which one type of defendant has a high probability of guilt and the other a 
comparatively low probability of guilt.  He notes that the plaintiff will offer either a high 
settlement that will be accepted only by the guilty, while the innocent litigate, or a low 
settlement that will be accepted by both innocent and guilty, resulting in no litigation.  In 
this model, the plaintiff will offer: (a) a low settlement that will be accepted by all of the 
guilty and resulting in litigation with some of the innocent, (b) a high settlement that will 
be accepted by some of the guilty while all of the innocent litigate, or (c) a blended 
settlement that will be accepted by most of the guilty and some of the innocent.  In all 
cases the innocent are disproportionately represented in litigation. 
 
I will focus on this blended solution, though the “single-type” solutions are easy to 
examine as special cases. The trial win rate for plaintiffs will depend on the average over 
the types of defendants.  Thus, the trial win rate is 
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The first term represents the effect of systemic asymmetry of information on the trial win 
rate, and the second reflects the effect of idiosyncratic asymmetry.  This expression can 




(1 )[(1 ) ]
(1 ) [ | ] (1 (1 ) ) [ | (1 )]d dd d d d
w w
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β θ
β ε ε θ β η η θ
+ − − −
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where β = Fε/[(1-r)Fε+rFη] > 1 given S*.  β measures the propensity of the innocent to 
litigate relative to the average propensity to litigate.  Also, (1–r)β is equal to the 
conditional probability of litigation given that the defendant is innocent. 
 
In the absence of any selection effects in settlement the trial win rate would be the same 
as the “population win rate” w = r(1 - θ1) + (1 - r)θ2, the rate that would be observed if all 
disputes went to trial.  However, selection distorts the trial win rate from the population 
win rate in two ways.  The first distortion, (1- β)[(1- θ1)-w], shows the negative effect of 
systemic information asymmetry, and the second distortion (third and fourth terms above) 
shows the effect of idiosyncratic informational asymmetry.  Since the conditional shock 
terms are both negative, the second distortion also suppresses the trial win rate below the 
population win rate. 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3223581 
 21 
The trial win rate is not any frequency imaginable, contrary to Shavell (1996).  The trial 
win rate is equal to the population win rate adjusted downward by selection effects, 
where the population win rate is a function of the equilibrium compliance and judicial 
error rates.  To be sure, the trial win rate could be any number between 0 and 1 in this 
model, but here there is a predictable link between the noncompliance rate r and the trial 
win rate.32  The trial win rate is in large part anchored by the noncompliance rate. 
 
B. Understanding Trial Outcomes 
 
In a high compliance equilibrium, the noncompliance rate r will be relatively low, and the 
downward bias due to selection by innocent defendants will be the dominant downward 
distortion from the population win rate.  For example, in the extreme case of perfect 
compliance (r = 0), there are no guilty defendants, yet the trial win rate is still biased 
downward as follows: 
 
2 2[ | )]dd d
S CE
J
θ ε ε θ−+ < −  
 
Thus, if we choose an area of litigation where compliance rates are high, we will observe 
low trial win rates.   
 
Medical malpractice litigation provides an illustration.  Under this “anchoring model,” 
low trial win rates can be taken as evidence of high compliance rates, coupled with 
selection toward innocent defendants (more specifically, the most confident innocent 
defendants) as litigants.  Since physicians generally comply with medical custom,33 
leading to high compliance rates (low noncompliance rates), this model predicts that one 
should, as a general matter, observe low trial win rates in medical malpractice litigation.  
Moreover, trial win rates in medical malpractice litigation should vary with the rate of 
                                                 
32 See Klerman and Lee (2014), Hylton (2002). 
33 See, e.g., White 1994, at 78.  One might argue that since most people comply with the law, this statement 
suggests that low win rates should be the norm.  However, the anchoring model here applies to systemic 
informational asymmetry cases (first), and (second) says only that win rates should both reflect and vary 
with compliance rates. 
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compliance.34  Since rates of compliance vary across regions, regional variation in 
medical malpractice win rates should reflect variation in compliance rates. 
 
Table 1 presents data, from Daniels and Martin (1986), on regional variation in medical 
malpractice win rates in New York counties (1980-1985).  Among the jurisdictions with 
at least 35 verdicts in their sample, win rates range from 51.2 percent in Bronx County to 
19.9 percent in Westchester County.  These rates reflect, in part, the mix of claims 
brought by plaintiffs. However, they also reflect local variation in the quality of medical 
malpractice – or, using the terms of this model, the compliance rate.  To test this 
hypothesis I include data in Table 1 on median household income in 1980 in the sample 
counties.35  Other things being equal, counties with higher household income should 
generally have access to higher quality medical care.  The win rates in Table 1 correlate 
negatively with household income levels, supporting the hypothesis that local variation in 
win rates reflects regional variation in the quality of medical care.  Thus, the data suggest 




                                                 
34 On compliance rate changes and win rates, see Hylton (2002), Klerman and Lee (2014). 
35 The win rate sample runs from 1980-84.  The census data are from 1979.   I also gathered median 
household income for 1989, and the ranking of counties remained the same as in 1979.  The only noticeable 
change was that the differential in median income between Queens and New York counties declined over 
the intervening years, putting them at near parity in 1989. 






Plaintiff Success Rates in New York Counties for Medical Malpractice 
      New York Supreme, Civil, and County Courts, 1981-84 
  




Median Household Income 
1979 
      
  














      New York  45 169  $13,904 
      
Queens  45.1 71  $17,028  
      
Westchester  19.9 39  $22,725 




Sources: Litigation data from Daniels and Martin (1986).  Median Household Income 
from U.S. Census 1979. 
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C. Trial Win Rate Variation Across Medical Specialties 
 
Some of the variations shown in the previous chart are attributable to variations in the 
mix of specialties heavily demanded in different regions.  Some regions, for example, 
may include a higher percentage of claims against pediatricians than do other regions.  
This suggests that it would be helpful to consider variation in plaintiff win rates across 
specialties as a way of ensuring that the previous chart is not entirely due to variation in 
the basket of specialties.  I present data on win rates across specialties in Figure 1 below. 
 
The two rightmost shaded areas of Figure 1 provide a visual representation of the win 
rate.  The low plaintiff win rates generally observed in medical malpractice hold across 
the specialties, again confirming the model’s predictions.  The exception is in diagnostic 
radiology, where the plaintiff win rate is close to fifty percent.  The win rates in the other 
specialties shown in Figure 1 range from roughly one tenth to one third.  The relatively 
high win rate for diagnostic radiology probably results from the lack of systemic 
informational asymmetry: a plaintiff’s expert can read an image (say, an x-ray or MRI 
report) as well as the defendant.  Diagnostic radiology differs from other specialty fields 
in that litigation involves parties with relatively equal information on the likelihood of 
malpractice.  This equality of information probably accounts for the relatively high win 









                                                 
36 Put another way, only idiosyncratic information, which could be two-sided, drives litigation.  I should 
note that an alternative potential explanation for the high trial win rate is that there may be a relatively low 
compliance rate in diagnostic radiology.  On radiology and the problem of quality standards, see 
http://www.radisphereradiology.com/misdiagnosis-is-pervasive-in-healthcare-and-radiology-is-part-of-the-
problem/.  This alternative explanation is also consistent with this paper’s model. 








Source: Jenna et al. (2012) 
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D. Plaintiff Win Rates and Compliance Rates 
 
In a low compliance equilibrium, the downward bias of the win rate due to settlement by 
guilty defendants will be the dominant distortion from the population win rate.  In the 
extreme of total noncompliance (r = 1), the trial win rate will be 
 
1 1(1 ) [ | (1 )]dd d
S CrE
J
θ η η θ−− + < − −  
 
Thus, the trial win rate will not to be as high as one would expect given the absence of 
compliance.  In particular, in settings of extremely low compliance, one should observe 
trial win rates that are significantly lower than one minus the error rate. 
 
There is empirical support for this prediction. A survey of several studies of medical 
malpractice win rates concludes that physicians win 80 percent to 90 percent of the jury 
trials with weak evidence of medical negligence, approximately 70 percent of the 
borderline cases, and even 50 percent of the trials in cases with strong evidence of 
medical negligence (Peters, 2007).  Figure 2 provides a summary of the findings.  Cases 
of strong evidence of medical negligence, using the terms of this anchoring model, are 
cases where the conditional probability of noncompliance is high.  The predicted plaintiff 
win rate for such cases should approximate 100 percent minus the probability of error.  
With error rates in medical malpractice estimated to be roughly 15 percent (White, 1994), 
the average plaintiff win rate for strong cases of medical negligence should be nearly 85 
percent.  The empirical studies, however, generate actual trial win rates for such cases of 
only 50 percent (see Figure 2).  The differential between observed and predicted trial win 




                                                 
37 One alternative possible explanation is that the false acquittal rate is especially high for “poor” care cases 
in Figure 2.  However, this seems implausible, because it would imply that physicians who are most 
negligent are also most likely to be acquitted by juries. 









   Figure 4: Source, Peters (2007).  Studies referenced in the figure: Farber and White 
(1991), Metzloff (1991), Peeples (2002), Taragin (1992), Studdert (2006), Daniels 
(1989), Liang (1997). 
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On the other extreme, consider the extremely low win rates reported for cases of weak 
evidence of malpractice – with a simple average of roughly 12 percent.  In the absence of 
selection, win rates against innocent doctors should be roughly equal to the 15 percent 
rate of error.  Assuming not all of the doctors were completely innocent in the samples of 
“weak evidence” cases, the reported win rates seem to be lower than one would expect.  
This is also consistent with selection even among innocent defendants, with those 
physicians who for rational though idiosyncratic reasons are pessimistic about their 
chances settling out of court. 
 
E. Comparing Judicial Forums 
 
What happens if you change the dispute resolution forum from one with a relatively low 
rate of error to one with a relatively high rate of error?  Moving from a bench trial to a 
jury trial, for example, is an example of moving from a more accurate forum to a less 
accurate forum.  To see what this implies in terms of this model, suppose the two error 
rates (Type I and Type II) are the same and equal to θ.  In the absence of any selection, an 
increase in the error rate would impact the plaintiff win rate by dw/dθ = 1-2r, so that if 
the compliance rate is low, error would reduce the win rate (more false acquittals) and if 
the compliance is high, error would increase the win rate (more false convictions). 
 
The effect of a change in error is complicated, but some insight can be gained from 
considering the extreme cases.  Suppose compliance is perfect, r = 0.  The change in the 
















where the first term, 1, is the pure “error rate effect” and the second, which is negative, is 
the selection effect induced by an increase in the error rate.  If the selection effect is 
greater than the error effect, the change in the win rate under perfect compliance, due to 
an increase in the rate of error, will be negative.  Intuitively, since the rate of false 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3223581 
 29 
convictions is higher under juries relative to judges, only those innocent defendants who 
know (because of idiosyncratic information) that their chance of victory is very high 
litigate, which depresses the trial win rate.  In short, it is no longer clear that error 
increases the trial win rate by increasing false convictions.  Similarly, in the case of total 
noncompliance the effect of a change in the error rate on the trial win rate could be 
positive because of selection. 
 
More generally, an increase in the error rate causes the trial win rate to change as follows: 
 
1 2
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Here the first line shows the “population win rate effect” and it depends on whether the 
compliance rate is less than or greater than 50 percent.  The second line, showing the 
impact of systemic asymmetry, is unambiguously positive.  The reason is that error tends 
to change the mix toward more guilty defendants, which increases the trial win rate.  The 
mix changes in favor of the guilty because the error rate increase implies more false 
acquittals.  The third and fourth lines show the impact of idiosyncratic asymmetry 
(combined with systemic asymmetry).  The third line is positive and fourth line is 
negative.  Overall, this suggests that counterintuitive results could be observed as a 
consequence of moving from a more accurate judicial forum to a less accurate forum.  If, 
for example, compliance is high (r < ½), then in the absence of selection one would 
expect the trial win rate to increase as the likelihood of false convictions increases.  But 
the expression above implies that selection by innocent defendants is stronger (because r 
< ½), pushing the win rate down.  If the selection effect dominates the population effect, 
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then moving a set of disputes involving high-compliance actors from a more accurate 
judicial forum to a less accurate forum could lead to a fall in the trial win rate. 
 
This analysis resolves a puzzle identified by Clermont and Eisenberg (1992), who found 
that plaintiff win rates are lower in jury trials than in bench trials for medical malpractice 
and product liability lawsuits (Table 2).  Both medical malpractice and products liability 
are areas where the legal standard typically points only to the defendant’s conduct, and 
where the defendant is likely to enjoy an informational advantage over plaintiffs.  One 
would ordinarily expect win rates to be higher under jury trials because most doctors 
comply and an increase in error would imply more false convictions.  However, when 
one takes into account selection due to informational asymmetry, the observation of 
Clermont and Eisenberg is explainable.  Both medical malpractice and products liability 
are areas where the market strongly encourages potential defendants to comply with the 
law, and consequently compliance rates are likely to be high.38  With high compliance 
rates, the selection effects of innocent defendants impose the dominant distortion.  
Innocent defendants settle more often under jury trials than under bench trials to avoid 
the greater risk of a false conviction by a jury, which reduces trial win rates in jury trials 
below those observed in bench trials. 
 
Clermont and Eisenberg also noted areas of litigation where win rates are higher in jury 
trials than in bench trials.  This is in accord with common intuition that juries favor 
plaintiffs.  However, rather than attributing this finding to the presumption that juries 
favor plaintiffs, the selection process modeled here provides a potentially superior 
explanation.  The two areas where win rates are higher under jury trials than under bench 
trials, in the Clermont and Eisenberg data, are FELA and marine torts.  In both, the high 
reported win rates likely reflect low compliance rates.39  The population effect considered 
alone (1-2r) would imply a reduction in the win rate in moving from judge to jury, 
contradicting the data.  However, on the assumption that the high win rates in these areas 
                                                 
38 On general compliance in medical malpractice, see White 1994, at 78 (noting that medical malpractice 
claims are rare). 
39 FELA lawsuits, for example, are against public sector employers, who are can pass on the liability 
burden to taxpayers.  Thus, FELA liability may not be effective in securing compliance. 
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reflect low compliance rates, the dominant selection effect would be positive, as the mix 
of litigants changes to include more guilty defendants, which is consistent with the data 
(Table 2). 
 
Finally, I should note that the other two statistically significant results in Table 2, for 
negotiable instruments and motor vehicle litigation, probably reflect the pure population 
effect 1-2r without a significant selection bias.  It is unlikely that systemic information 
asymmetry is substantial in either area. 
 
 





Outcomes in Sizable Categories Involving Clear Judge/Jury Choice 
  
        





   
N (Completed) 
Win 






       Airplane Personal 
Injury 75 0.53 324 0.62 0.85 
Federal Employers' 
Liability 94 0.62 1168 0.72 
           
0.86* 
Assault, Libel, 
Slander 86 0.43 339 0.49 0.88 
Marine Personal 
Injury 889 0.57 1455 0.64 
           
0.89*** 
Other Personal 
Injury 516 0.51 2769 0.49 1.04 
General Contract 
 
3979 0.69 2458 0.66 1.05 
Torts to Personal 
Property 732 0.63 458 0.59 1.07 
Torts to Land 
 
203 0.66 149 0.6 1.1 
Negotiable 
Instruments 643 0.81 173 0.73 




308 0.67 265 0.59 1.14 
Motor Vehicle 
 
590 0.69 3633 0.60 
           
1.15*** 
        Prod-Med 
      
Product Liability 
 
456 0.48 3648 0.28 
           
1.71*** 
Medical Malpractice 64 0.50 732 0.29 
           
1.72*** 
        * Judge/jury win rates differ at .05 level; ** at .01 level; *** at .001 
level 
   
Source: Clermont and Eisenberg (1992). 
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F. Appeals and Reversals 
 
Trials in this model are black boxes that generate results with stable rates of error.  
Knowing the rates of settlement for the innocent (i.e., nonliable) and guilty respectively 
and the error rates, one could calculate the ex post rate of wrongful convictions within a 




(1 )( | )
(1 ) ( ) (1 )
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This suggests that as the compliance rate increases, the proportion of falsely convicted 
defendants in the sample of convictions increases.  Indeed, as the compliance rate 
approaches 100 percent (r approaches 0), so does the percentage of innocent defendants 

















Thus, as the rate of compliance approaches zero, the percentage of guilty defendants 
within the pool of acquittals approaches one hundred percent. 
 
Appeals are likely to be associated with these pools of defendants. The innocent who 
have been found liable know that they have been falsely convicted (because of their 
systemic informational advantage) and therefore have a strong incentive to appeal.  The 
guilty who have been acquitted have no incentive to appeal, but plaintiffs – who know the 
respective settlement rates of the guilty and the innocent, and the judicial error rates – are 
more likely to file appeals as the share of the falsely acquitted increases within the pool 
of acquitted defendants.40 
 
                                                 
40 This assumes that trial is insufficient to resolve informational asymmetry between the parties, see Hay 
(1995). 
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As a general matter, probability of innocence given a conviction is greater than the 

















Given that Fε(S*) > Fη(S*), this inequality holds for middling to high rates of compliance 
(assuming that judicial error rates are small and of similar magnitude), which suggests 
that the share of falsely convicted defendants is larger than the share of falsely acquitted 
defendants – except where rates of compliance are low.  Moreover, the incentive to 
appeal is greater among the falsely convicted defendants than among plaintiffs who 
believe that they lost because of error.  This is because a falsely convicted defendant 
knows that the likelihood of reversal is just one minus the rate of false conviction error at 
the appellate level.  If error rates are the same on appeal as at trial, the reversal 
probability for such a defendant is  
 
2( | ) 1P reversal innocent θ= −  
 
The plaintiff who appeals an acquittal, by contrast, can only infer the defendant’s guilt 
from information on settlement and error rates.  For such a plaintiff, the perceived 
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− −
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+ − − + − −
. 
 
Since this is likely to be less than P(reversal | innocent), the wrongly convicted defendant 
has a higher likelihood of appealing his conviction than would a plaintiff facing a 
wrongly acquitted defendant. Put more plainly, defendants, who will tend to have an 
informational advantage as to their guilt or innocence, are very likely to appeal when 
innocent, while plaintiffs generally appeal on the basis of hazier information. 
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These implications of the model explain the data on appeals shown in Table 3.  Eisenberg 
and Heise (2009, 2015) and Clermont and Eisenberg (2001) report that reversal rates on 
appeal generally favor defendants.  The first six rows of Table 3 show statistically 
significant reversal rate differentials from the Eisenberg and Heise (2009) study, which 
examines a sample of state civil trials (a longitudinal sample from 2001 to 2005).  
Overall, the reversal rate for state civil trials appealed by plaintiffs is 21.5 percent 
compared to 41.5 percent for trial outcomes appealed by defendants.  Reversal rates for 
appeals in the broad categories of torts (38 versus 21 percent) and contracts (46 versus 22 
percent) show a defendant advantage.  A narrower category consisting of “assault, libel, 
and slander” cases shows a dramatic defendant advantage (73 versus 8 percent).  In sum, 
the reversal rates from state civil trials are consistent with this model’s prediction that the 
share of wrongly convicted defendants would generally exceed the share of wrongly 
acquitted defendants and that appeal incentives in disputes involving the former would be 
significantly greater than for the latter.   
 
The bottom three rows of Table 3 show Clermont and Eisenberg’s data from a sample of 
federal civil trials (1988-97).  Substantial reversal-rate differentials are observed in the 
categories of “assault, libel, slander”, “other personal injury”, and product liability.  
Product liability and defamation cases are areas where defendants are likely to enjoy a 
systemic informational advantage.41  In product liability cases, the defendant is in a better 
position than the plaintiff to know the feasibility of an alternative design proposed by the 
plaintiff.  In defamation cases, the defendant is likely to have much better information 
than the plaintiff on potential privileges and justifications.42  The “other personal injury” 
                                                 
41 This is even more likely to be true in medical malpractice. However, the data on medical malpractice 
cases were too thin for Clermont and Eisenberg to report a statistically significant result.  Clermont and 
Eisenberg argue that their results do not support the selection hypothesis, but they appear to rely on a 
version of the hypothesis in which differential stakes rather than informational asymmetry drives selection. 
42 This is also consistent with low plaintiff win rates observed in defamation cases.  See, e.g., Clermont and 
Eisenberg (1998), at 596.  The category of assault and defamation combined distorts the win rates in both 
subcategories.  Win rates for intentional torts tend to be high, while win rates for defamation are low.  See 
http://www.courtstatistics.org/~/media/microsites/files/csp/highlights/16_4_medical_malpractice_on_appea
l.ashx. 
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category, which consists mostly of tort actions against businesses,43 is a broad category 
where the Table 3 results probably reflect the generally superior information possessed 
by such defendants on their own levels of precaution.  These results further support the 
prediction that defendants who have an informational advantage and regard themselves as 
innocent are very likely to appeal while plaintiffs who appeal do so on the basis of greater 
uncertainty about the defendant’s guilt.44 
 
Table 3 also shows that the reversal rate from jury trials exceeds that for bench trials, 
which is also consistent with this model’s predictions.  Given that only the defendants 
who are most likely to prevail are taking their chances with juries in this model, appeals 
from these defendants are likely to be overturned more often than defendant appeals from 
bench trials, given reasonably accurate appellate courts.  The jury trial is the less accurate 
forum, but it places plaintiff and defendant in roughly comparable positions as in the 
bench trial.  Reversal rates for both types of litigant are higher, but the reversal rate 
differential stays roughly the same, as shown in Table 3. 
                                                 
43 These lawsuits consist of tort cases that have been excluded from the categories of medical malpractice, 
airplane, motor vehicle, product liability, and the combined category “assault and defamation”. 
44 For additional (and direct) evidence on rates of appeal, showing that appeal rates are higher for medical 
malpractice and products liability defendants, see Court Statistics Project: Caseload Highlights: Examining 
the Work of State Courts, vol. 14, Number 1, March 2007, 
http://www.courtstatistics.org/~/media/microsites/files/csp/data%20pdf/vol14num1civiltrialsonappeal1.ash
x.  




State and Federal Reversal Rates, by Case Category and Trial Type  
      Case Category 
 
Reversal Rates (%) 
 
Significance of D-P Difference 




      State 
     




                 .000 
      Assault, Libel, Slander 73.3 8.3 
 
                 .001 




                 .002 




                 .000 




                 .000 




                 .013 
      Federal 
     
      Assault, Libel, Slander 40 9.09 
 
                 .030 
      Other Personal Injury 27.78 10.9 
 
                 .000 




                 .000 
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V. Selection and Legal Evolution 
 
Suppose instead of systemic informational asymmetry, as assumed previously, the 
defendant’s private information is only of the idiosyncratic sort.  Thus, given the 
equilibrium compliance rate, the defendant’s expectation of being found liable is 
 
Pd = w + εd 
  
For such an uninformed defendant, a settlement will be possible only if the payment S < 
(w + εd)J + Cd, and it follows that  
 
*







The settlement model presented earlier can be carried through here to find the optimal 
settlement demand on the part of the plaintiff.  Supposing the idiosyncratic shock follows 
a Uniform distribution, the optimal settlement demand from the plaintiff is S* = (a+w)J - 
Cp.45  Substituting S*, and letting σε represent the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic 
shock, the probability of litigation against a defendant whose private information is of a 
purely idiosyncratic type (either because the defendant is uninformed or the plaintiff 
knows the defendant’s type) is 
 
1( | ) 1
2 3
p dC CP litigate no asymmetry
Jεσ
  + 
= −      
 
 
Now return to the case of systemic asymmetry of information.  For the case of litigation 
against an innocent defendant: 
 
                                                 
45 This assumes lower and upper bounds – a and a, and 2a > (Cp + Cd)/J.  The offer S* is the solution for 
the systemic asymmetry case and also the solution for the case, examined here, where the sole defendant 
has only idiosyncratic information. 
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21( | ) 1
2 3 2 3




  +  −
= − +     
 
 
The last term in this expression is positive, suggesting that litigation is more frequent 
compared to the case where the defendant has no systemic informational advantage.  For 
the case of litigation against guilty defendants 
 
1(1 )1( | ) 1
2 3 2 3




  +  − −
= − +     
 
 
The last term is negative, suggesting less litigation compared to the case where there is no 
systemic asymmetry. 
 
A. Priest-Klein and Selection Generally 
 
Several observations follow from the foregoing expressions.  First, the Priest-Klein 
hypothesis can be discerned from these equations by examining the probability of 
litigation for the case of no systemic information asymmetry – that is, only idiosyncratic 
asymmetry.  Litigation declines as the sum of litigation costs increases, and increases 
with the judgment, as in the traditional Landes-Posner-Gould model.46  Notice, however, 
that litigation increases with the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic shock.  If the 
standard deviation of the idiosyncratic shock increases as the population win rate 
approaches 50 percent, then the Priest-Klein hypothesis follows immediately: litigation 
will tend to be dominated by cases in which the expected win rate is 50 percent.47  To 
replicate the Priest-Klein conjecture within this model, then, one need only assume that σε 
is a function of the population win rate w and that the function reaches it maximum when 
w is 50 percent.  This is a natural assumption because idiosyncratic informational 
differences should be greatest when the question of compliance is most uncertain. 
                                                 
46 The “LPG” model refers to the basic settlement analysis set out in Landes (1971), Posner (1973),and 
Gould (1973). 
47 For a formal derivation of the Priest-Klein conjecture, see Lee and Klerman (2016).  See also Hylton and 
Lin (2011). 
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Although the assumption that the shock variance σε reaches its maximum when the 
probability of plaintiff victory is 50 percent seems natural, there is no reason to think that 
it must be this way in all cases.  There may be some areas of litigation where σε reaches a 
maximum at another location, such as near one of the endpoints of the probability 
spectrum.  For example, if it is not clear what you have to do to comply with the law, 
then a defendant who has every reason to believe that he is innocent may still perceive a 
substantial risk that the court might find facts to justify a guilty verdict.  In such a case, σε 
might be large near the innocence pole.48  This would make cases of innocence likely to 
come to court, and drive observed plaintiff win rates low.  In other words, the Priest-
Klein model, as presented here, can account for high, medium, or low trial win rates, 
even without the assumption of unequal litigation stakes, depending on the position along 
the probability spectrum where the idiosyncratic shock variance reaches a maximum.  Of 
course, the most plausible default assumption is that this maximum occurs in the middle 
of the spectrum. 
 
Now consider systemic asymmetry.  If the idiosyncratic shock variance σε declines as we 
move toward the endpoints of the spectrum of the likelihood of a plaintiff victory (which, 
again, is the plausible default assumption), then the variance of the idiosyncratic shock 
will matter less as a driver of litigation in cases of systemic asymmetry.  For such cases, 
the last terms in the last two equations, reflecting systemic information asymmetry 
effects, take on greater importance as drivers of litigation.  Thus, Priest-Klein-type 
selection emerges here as a special case within a simple model that also generates 
selection based on information asymmetry.49  The greater rate of litigation involving 
innocent defendants drives win rates down from the 50 percent “base-case” level (e.g., 
Hylton, 2006). 
 
B. Legal Evolution 
                                                 
48 Given the endpoint constraint, the distribution of the idiosyncratic shock conditional on the low value of 
w would have to be skewed.  A “skew Uniform” distribution would allow for these assumptions. 
49 Depending on the parameters of this model, selection based on “differential expectations” or information 
asymmetry can be observed.  For an empirical studies examining which type of selection best matches the 
data, see Waldfogel (1998), Siegelman and Waldfogel (1999). 
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As Priest (1980) noted, if litigation is driven by idiosyncratic shocks, resulting in plaintiff 
win rates of 50 percent, then doctrinal trends would hardly ever be observed.  The law 
would appear to follow a random walk, in which trends in favor of plaintiffs would be 
just as likely as trends in favor of defendants.  Priest’s implicit assumption, which I find 
plausible, is that trends in the law reflect the side with the best success rate in litigation.   
 
In the case of systemic asymmetry, the random walk is unlikely.50  In particular, if 
innocent defendants tend to litigate more often, and appeal more often, then trends in 
favor of defendants are likely to result.  However, the law will be altered by the 
incorporation of private information held by defendants in the shaping of legal standards.  
A general cost-benefit standard such as the Hand Formula, for example, has ambiguous 
implications for efficiency if the standard is not informed by factually accurate 
assessments of cost and benefit.51  The biased pattern of litigation induced by 
informational asymmetry ensures that general legal standards incorporate private (and 
therefore accurate) information (Hylton, 2006). 
 
However, this is not the complete story on evolution of law.  I have so far assumed 
systemic informational asymmetry only with respect to compliance.  However, if one 
party knows the probability of judicial error, while the other party does not, the party 
with superior information on error will litigate more, biasing win rates in his favor.  
Suppose the defendant knows that the true judicial error rates are θ̃1 and θ̃2.  Now the 
probability of litigation against such a defendant is 
 
1 1 2 2( ) (1 )( )1P( ) 1
2 3 2 3
p dC C r rlitigate
Jε ε
θ θ θ θ
σ σ
  +  − + − −




                                                 
50 It should be clear that altering the allocation of legal expenses (e.g., British rule) could change the pattern 
of evolution in this model. 
51 See Cooter, Kornhauser, and Lane (1979).  Although related, the incorporation of accurate private factual 
information into legal standards, as a process through which the law becomes more efficient, should be 
distinguished from the minimization of bias due to extreme policy preferences among judges.  On the latter 
process, see Gennaioli and Shleifer (2007). 
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If the defendant’s information is favorable to himself, the likelihood of litigation is higher 
than otherwise.  Plaintiff win rates will be biased in favor of the defendant because of the 
defendant’s informational advantage with respect to the likelihood of judicial error. 
 
In this evolutionary process, legal standards are not enhanced in accuracy or made more 
efficient by litigation.  Indeed, the rule of law is destroyed over time, as Bentham 
suggested, by biasing due to litigation involvingy parties with superior information on 
judicial errors.  Such information could result from having superior access to or control 
over the officers of the courts.52 
 
If we define microevolution as marginal changes in the law (e.g., recognizing facts that 
create exceptions to a settled rule) and macroevolution as the complete abrogation of a 
rule, the foregoing expressions suggest three types of microevolution in the common law.  
One is a white noise process observed under Priest-Klein assumptions, and described in 
Priest (1980).53  A second is microevolution toward efficiency, through the incorporation 
of private information in updated legal standards.54  A third is microevolution toward 
biased rules, of the sort envisioned by Bentham, where the law gradually becomes the 
property of advantaged classes.   
 
This model’s analysis has no bearing on the question of macroevolution of law, addressed 
by Rubin (1977) and Cooter and Kornhauser (1980).  Inefficient legal rules could 
generate more litigation, until the rules are undone.  Alternatively, injunctive settlements 
of litigation could quietly overturn inefficient rules (Hylton and Cho, 2010), replacing 
them with efficient norms or conventions (Ellickson, 1991). 
 
VI. Conclusion 
                                                 
52 Gennaioli and Shleifer (2007) show that biased judges distort the path of evolution toward inefficiency.  
However, if parties know of the judges’ biases, they will settle.  In this paper’s model, by contrast, bias in 
legal evolution results from selective litigation caused by differential knowledge of judicial biases. 
53 As noted before, this argument is traditionally associated with Bentham.  However, the specific 
connection between this theory and litigation is suggested in Holmes (1881), 126-128 (discussing litigation 
and resolution of uncertainty over the negligence standard). 
54 This type of evolution is associated with the common law efficiency hypothesis.  On updating of standard 
to incorporate information of litigants, see Cooter Kornhauser, and Lane (1979); Hylton (2006). 
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Since this is a cradle-to-gave model of litigation, there are many subjects to which it 
could be applied and perhaps generate novel results.  For example, the effects of litigation 
cost allocation rules on incentives to take care, or to litigate disputes, could be examined 
within this model.55  However, I will leave such investigations for later work.  My aim 
here has been to show that both intuitive and counterintuitive implications for deterrence 
can be derived from a model that takes information costs seriously, that the same model 
can be employed to resolve puzzles in the data on trial and settlement, and to characterize 
processes of legal evolution. 
                                                 
55 E.g., Hylton (1990) examines these issues, but within a more cumbersome model than the one used here. 
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